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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
found, on appeal, that the attachment was validily dissolved.
On the other hand, if he chooses not to appeal suspensively,
jurisdiction over the action is lost and the creditor's suit
terminated.
Joseph W. Milner
QUASI CONTRACTS -THE FUND DOCTRINE
Plaintiffs in the instant proceeding were attorneys who, in a
prior suit, had been employed to represent a relatively small
group of depositors opposing a tableaux for distribution of funds
held by a bank in liquidation. The basis of the depositors' oppo-
sition was that interest from the date of liquidation had not been
included in the proposed distribution. The trial court had award-
ed interest not only to the claiming depositors represented by
plaintiffs but also to all depositors. On appeal of the depositors'
case, the appellant, the banking commissioner, contended that the
lower court had erred in awarding interest to the depositors from
the inception of the liquidation. He also contended that the lower
court had erred in awarding interest to depositors who failed to
oppose the distribution. During that appeal, the attorneys had
sought affirmance of the judgment of the lower court which had
allowed interest from the inception of the liquidation; they also
had sought to have the judgment affirmed with respect to the
unrepresented depositors. The Supreme Court had affirmed the
lower court in allowing interest to all depositors from the incep-
tion of the liquidation.' The attorneys then sought compensation
for professional services rendered to all depositors. The bases of
their claim are: first, in answering the appeal of the depositors'
case, they had sought affirmance of the judgment allowing inter-
est from the inception of the liquidation for their clients, and
also had sought affirmance of the judgment allowing interest to
the unrepresented depositors; and second, if the proposed distri-
bution had not been opposed, the depositors as a class would have
received no interest. The lower court rejected this claim; the
Supreme Court, on rehearing, held, reversed. These attorneys
have brought themselves within the "fund doctrine," and they
should recover attorneys' fees, on a quantum meruit, out of the
funds so created. In re Interstate Trust and Banking Company,
235 La. 825, 106 So.2d 276 (1958).
1. In re Interstate Trust and Banking Co., 222 La. 979, 64 So.2d 240 (1953).
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As a general rule, the right to remuneration for services ren-
dered depends upon an express contract.2 However, both common
law and civil law jurisdictions have exceptions to this general
rule. In common law jurisdictions a contract for services ren-
dered may be express, implied in fact, or implied in law. The
distinction between express contracts and contracts that are im-
plied in fact is merely that in the former the will and intention
of the parties are expressed in words, while in the latter the
mutual intent of the parties is manifested by particular acts and
circumstances. 3 Under a contract implied in fact the party ren-
dering the services may recover from the other the value thereof;
this valuation is determined on a quantum meruit.4 The law im-
plies an agreement to pay the reasonable value of services per-
formed which may include a claim for reasonable profits.5 Con-
tracts which are implied in law must not be confused with ex-
press contracts or contracts implied in fact. Contracts implied
in law, more properly called quasi contracts, are obligations im-
posed by law on grounds of justice and equity to prevent unjust
enrichment. 6 Here recovery is based on the benefit received by
the defendant and not on the reasonable market value of the
services. 7
The "fund doctrine" is a theory by which a court exercising
equitable jurisdiction may allow an attorney a reasonable fee out
of a fund created or preserved, when the party the attorney rep-
2. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 18 (1950) ; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 443;
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3 (2d ed. 1936).
3. Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 33 Am. Rep. 396 (1878) ; McCormick v. City
of Niles, 81 Ohio St. 246, 90 N.E. 803 (1909); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 5
(1932); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3 (2d
ed. 1936).
4. Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123 (1873) ; McGuire v. Hughes, 207
N.Y. 516, 101 N.E. 860 (1913) ; Johnson County Say. Bank v. City of Creston,
212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705, 84 A.L.R. 926 (1930) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 107 (1932) ; Note, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 209 (1957) ; BLACK, LAW Dic-
TIONARY (4th ed. 1951) : "Quantum meruit: Founded on an implied assumpsit or
promise on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much as he reasonably
deserves to have for his labor."
5. Johnson County Say. Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W.
705, 84 A.L.R. 926 (1930) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 19-20 (1950) ; 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 3 (2d ed. 1936).
6. Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal.2d 605, 95 P.2d 927, 125 A.L.R. 1424 (1939) ; Taulbee
v. McCarty, 114 Ky. 199, 137 S.W. 1045 (1911) ; Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.
Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 40 N.D. 69, 168 N.W. 684, 12 A.L.R. 744
(1918); 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN'TARIES * 161; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 20
(1950); SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 220-23 (2d ed. 1895); WOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS §§ 2-4 (1913). BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) : "Un-
just enrichment: Doctrine permits recovery in certain instances where a person has
received from another a benefit retention of which would be unjust. Doctrine is
not contractual but equitable in nature."
7. See note 6 supra.
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resented has maintained at his own expense a suit for the pres-
ervation or creation of a common fund in which others are en-
titled to share.8 The attorney must have been employed by his
client either to represent the particular client's interest or to rep-
resent the class." If the employment is solely to represent a par-
ticular client, and a fund is created or preserved for a class, the
attorney is allowed to recover not only upon the express contract
with his client, but also a reasonable compensation for his serv-
ices from the fund in which the class is entitled to share. In such
cases the court implies a contract between the class and the at-
torney and allows recovery of a reasonable compensation for
services performed. 10
Civil law jurisdictions also provide for quasi contracts." The
French Civil Code provides that a quasi contract is that lawful
and voluntary act of man from which an obligation of restitution
arises.12 The French Code categorizes implied contracts as: (1)
those arising from the payment of a thing not due,"' and (2)
those arising from the management of another's affairs, or nego-
tiorum gestio.14 The only limitations on negotiorum gestio under
the French Code are:15
(1) At the time of the undertaking it was to the owner's
advantage;
(2) The negotiorum gestor must undertake the affairs vol-
untarily;
(3) The negotiorum gestor must not act purely for his own
interest;
(4) The owner must not have prohibited the management.
As the French Code specifically states, the management may be
done with or without the owner's knowledge, 1" and the negotio-
rum gestor is entitled to be reimbursed. 1" Under a literal inter-
8. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) ; Central Railroad
& Banking Co. v. Peltus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) ; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881) ; Bishop and Collin v. Macon Lumber Co., 149 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Ky.
1957) ; Annots., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927), 107 A.L.R. 727 (1937).
9. 107 A.L.R. 749 (1937).
10. Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927), 107 A.L.R. 727 (1937).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2292-2314 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1370-
1381; CHALLIES, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN QUEBEC 104 (1940).
12. FRENCH CIVI CODE art. 1370.
13. Id. arts. 1376-1381.
14. Id. arts. 1371-1375.
15. Ibid.; AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 203 (1935).
16. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1372.
17. Id. art. 1375.
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pretation of the French Code the negotiorum gestor may recover
only useful and necessary expenses, and he is not entitled to re-
muneration for services.'8 However, the French courts have
granted remuneration for the reasonable value of services where
the negotiorum gestor renders professional or technical services
in the ordinary line of his profession or trade, holding that they
may be reasonably regarded as an expense to the gestor.19 In
addition to applying the code provisions on implied contracts,
the French courts have developed the doctrine of enrichessement
sans cause.20 This doctrine is based on the equitable theory that
no person should benefit at the expense of another. According
to this doctrine, recovery is not based upon the expenses involved
but rather upon the benefit received by the owner.21
With few exceptions, the Louisiana courts have placed the
same limitations on negotiorum gestio as have the French
courts.22 The requirement that the gestor undertake the affairs
voluntarily gave the court some trouble in the case of Weber v.
Granguard23 because the gestor had managed the affairs at the
request of a third party who in fact had no authority. In this
case the court held the request was of no moment, and said that
the management was nonetheless within the provisions of the
Code.
A search of the Louisiana cases has revealed no case in which
recovery was allowed for services rendered under the theory of
negotiorum gestio, and, in fact, the articles of the Code on nego-
tiorum gestio have been seldom used in deciding cases.24 A num-
18. Ibid.
19. AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 204 (1935); BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS § 2821 (1905); Lorenzen,
Negotiorun Gestio in the Civil Law, 13 CORN. L.Q. 204 (1928).
20. CIALLIES, .UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN QUEBEC 20 (1940).
21. See note 20 supra. The amount of recovery would be different if negotiorum
gestio were applied. See page 902 supra.
22. See page 904 infra; LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2295-2299 (1870) ; Comment, 7
TUL. L. REV. 257 (1932) ; Lorenzen, Negotiorum Geatio in the Civil Law, 13 CORN.
L.Q. 190 (1928).
As to the gestor acting in his own interest, see DeBlanc v. Texas Co., 121 F.2d
774 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Tate v. Dupuis, 195 So. 810 (La. App. 1940); Toler v.
Bunch, 34 La. Ann. 997 (1882) ; Becnel v. Becnel, 23 La. Ann. 150 (1871).
As to gestor acting against the owner's wishes, see Succession of Kernan, 105
La. 592, 30 So. 239 (1901) ; Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882) ; O'Hara
v. Krentz, 26 La. Ann. 504 (1874).
He may act even though the owner has no knowledge of the facts. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2295 (1870). He is entitled to be reimbursed for all useful and neces-
sary expenses. Id. art. 2299; Eyless v. Roly Motor Co., 11 La. App. 442, 123 So.
477 (1929).
23. 173 La. 653, 138 So. 433 (1931) ; Comment, 7 TUL. L. Rzv. 254 (1937).
24. Comment, 7 TUL. L. REV. 256, 257 (1932); Note, 24 TUL. L. REV. 141
(1950).
19591
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
ber of Louisiana cases have held a defendant liable under the
common law theory of quasi contract where he had received bene-
ficial services for which it is customary to compensate the per-
son performing the work.25 In Louisiana, as in common law, re-
covery is based on the benefit conferred upon the defendant, or
unjust enrichment. As early as 1842 the Louisiana courts also
applied the doctrine of implied in fact contracts and allowed re-
covery on a quantum meruit based on the reasonable value of
services rendered. 26 Even though the courts have allowed recov-
ery for services rendered under the theories of unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit, they have in the past, with the exception of
one relatively old case,27 refused to extend any of these concepts
to an attorney whose services have benefited others besides his
particular clients. 28 In a recent case on this subject the Supreme
Court held that under the jurisprudence of this state it is well
settled that attorneys representing particular claimants in a suit
may only look to their clients for compensation no matter how
valuable the services were to other parties.29
In the instant case the court reviewed the jurisprudence and
found that only one earlier case had allowed attorneys to recover
under similar circumstances,30 but this had not been followed.
25. Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., 207 La. 767, 22 So.2d 59
(1945) ; Beall v. Van Bibber, 19 La. Ann. 434 (1867) ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La.
Ann. 197 (1846).
26. Sugar Field Oil Co. v. Carter, 214 La. 586, 38 So.2d 249 (1948) ; Ker-
nagham and Cordill v. Uthoff, 180 La. 791, 157 So. 595 (1934) ; Dunbar v. Butler,
2 Rob. 32 (La. 1842) ; Succession of Berthelot, 24 So.2d 185 (La. App. 1945)
Sucession of Peres, 174 So. 130 (La. App. 1937).
According to Louisiana and common law jurisprudence recovery can be had
under the theories of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit depending on the cir-
cumstances. Recovery under unjust enrichment is determined by the benefit to the
defendant; under quantum meruit it is determined by the reasonable value of the
plaintiff's services. In addition to these theories the Louisiana Civil Code provides
for the recovery of useful and necessary expenses when one manages the affairs
of another. Here recovery is based on depletion of patrimony. The French courts
achieve the same results through the code articles on the management of another's
affairs and the theory of enrichessement sang cause. Under the French Code a
gestor may recover useful and necessary expenses based on depletion of patrimony,
and if he renders services in the line of his profession the courts have allowed re-
covery for the reasonable value thereof. Under the theory of enrichessement sans
cause he may recover that by which the defendant is benefited.
27. McGraw v. Andrus, 45 La. Ann. 1073, 13 So. 630 (1893).
28. Succession of Russell, 208 La. 213, 23 So.2d 50 (1945) ; Price v. Foster,
182 La. 79, 161 So. 161 (1935) ; Dreifus v. Colonial Bank and Trust Co., 127 La.
1086, 54 So. 358 (1911) ; Forman v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,
119 La. 491, 43 So. 908 (1907) ; Succession of Kernan, 105 La. 592, 30 So. 239
(1901) ; Wailes v. Succession of Brown, 27 La. Ann. 411 (1875); Michon v.
Gravier, 11 La. Ann. 596 (1856) ; Cooley v. Cecile, 8 La. Ann. 51 (1853); Roselius
v. Delachaise, 5 La. Ann. 481 (1850).
29. Succession of Guichard, 225 La. 315, 77 So.2d 744 (1954).
30. See note 27 supra.
NOTES
After discussing the application of the fund doctrine in other
states and noting that the appeal in the instant case was on be-
half of the unrepresented depositors as well as the attorneys'
original clients, the court applied the fund doctrine basing recov-
ery on a quantum meruit. In determining the amount to be
awarded as reasonable attorneys' fees the court held that the fol-
lowing factors should be considered: "the extent and nature of
services rendered; the labor, time and trouble involved; the result
achieved; the character and importance of the matter; the
amount of money involved; the learning, skill and experience
exercised; and the difficulty of the legal problem involved."' s
Justice McCaleb, in a concurring opinion, stated that the case
should be decided under the Civil Code articles applying to the
management of another's affairs.
In the light of common law jurisprudential development, the
fund doctrine seems nothing more than applying the theory of
quasi contracts to the services of an attorney which have created
or preserved a fund benefiting others. Courts applying this fund
doctrine simply hold that when a party has benefited from an at-
torney's services a quasi contract comes into existence. The con-
tract between the attorney and the group is quasi contractual in
nature as there is no intention on the part of the group to con-
tract with the attorney. This being the case, it is submitted that
if recovery is allowed on this theory it should not be based on the
reasonable value of the services to the person rendering the serv-
ices,8 2 but rather on unjust enrichment.88 That is, the services
should be valued in the light of the benefit received from the
services.
Under Article 2184 a court should proceed in equity only when
the law is not expressed as to that point. In Justice McCaleb's
concurring opinion he states that when an attorney has per-
formed valuable services for another without expressed or im-
plied authority he should recover pursuant to the articles on the
management of another's affairs.8" In order to apply these ar-
ticles the following questions would have to be answered in the
affirmative. First, should useful and necessary expenses be con-
31. In a note the court added that attorneys could not recover from the orig-
inal clients on a quantum meruit as the express contract between the parties de-
termined their legal relationship. In re Interstate Trust and Banking Co., 235 La.
825, 843, 106 So.2d 276, 292 (1958).
32. See page 904 8upra, note 26 supra.
33. See page 904 supra; note 25 supra.
34. LA. CIVIM CODE (1870).
35. Id. arts. 2295-2299.
19591
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
strued to include the gestor's services? Apparently the court
could justify an affirmative answer by looking to the French
jurisprudence and holding that where the gestor renders profes-
sional or technical services in the ordinary lines of his profes-
sion or trade these services may be regarded as a reasonable and
necessary expense.36 Second, should his services be regarded as
voluntary? Apparently so, under the holding of Weber v. Gran-
guard. The fact that the gestor acted at the request of one who
in fact had no authority should make no difference. The third
question and undoubtedly the most difficult is: should an attor-
ney be allowed to undertake, of his own accord, the management
of another's affairs. The Civil Code makes no distinction be-
tween an attorney and any other gestor; however, the Canons of
Professional Ethics provide that an attorney should not volun-
tarily impose his service upon another. Under the fund doctrine
an attorney must have been employed by at least one interested
party,8 7 but the articles on negotiorum gestio have no such limi-
tation. It is submitted that since the law is adequately expressed
as to this point the court might decide the case within the bounds
of the code articles on the management of another's affairs. 8
However, since the legal profession has chosen to limit the capac-
ity of its members to act as gestors, the court should consider
this and apply the articles only when the attorney has acted at
the request of a third party, as in the Weber case; or when the
circumstances are such, as in the instant case, that if no action is
taken the group would stand to lose the entire fund.
Gordon A. Pugh
TORTS - DUTY OF OCCUPIER TO SOCIAL GUESTS
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages sustained
when she slipped on a rug in the home of her son-in-law. The
plaintiff was a guest in the home and she brought this action
against the son-in-law's insurer. The rug sometimes stretched,
thereby causing it to slip or wrinkle. The plaintiff maintained
that the host negligently maintained premises unsafe for his
36. Under the French holdings on negotiorum gestio and the French doctrine
as applied at common law, recovery would be the same as the reasonable value of
the attorney's services. See note 19 supra and page 903 supra.
37. See page 901 supra.
38. See note 35 supra.
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